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I. Introduction
Freedom of expression is protected by several national constitutions and a range of international law instruments. 1 The notion of expression is broad, and the question of whether commercial expression should be protected at all and, if so, at what level has sparked lively controversies, particularly in the United States of America. Nevertheless, the question of protection of commercial expression has yet to be resolved satisfactorily.
One of the public interest reasons put forward to limit the freedom of commercial operators to advertise their goods and services is public health. Certain goods and services, such as illicit drugs, may be so dangerous that they are not allowed on the market and cannot, as such, be lawfully advertised. Beyond these products and services, the marketing of which does not benefit from constitutional protection at all, there are others the consumption of which is not recommended but which are not deemed sufficiently harmful to be banned from the market altogether. They include, most notably: tobacco, alcohol, medicines and medicinal treatments, unhealthy food and gambling services. Growing evidence that advertising and other forms of promotion do impact on lifestyle choices supports the argument that public authorities have an interest in regulating the advertising of such goods and services in the name of public health protection.
This chapter focuses on the extent to which public health has been relied upon by the EU legislature or by Member States of the European Union to limit the freedom of commercial II. The Information Paradigm as a Justification for the
Constitutional Protection of the Freedom of Commercial Expression
The First Amendment to the US Constitution protects freedom of expression: ‗Congress shall make no law … abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press …'. It nonetheless leaves the notion of 'expression' undefined. The question has therefore arisen of whether commercial expression, and advertising more specifically, falls within its scope. This question does not suggest an obvious answer, as the evolution of the case law of the US Supreme Court illustrates.
In the Valentine v Christensen case, which involved the validity of a New York ordinance banning the distribution of advertisements in the streets, the Supreme Court ruled that commercial free speech did not fall within the realm of protection of the First Amendment to the US Constitution:
[T]he Constitution imposes no restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising. Whether, and to what extent, one may promote or pursue a gainful occupation in the streets, to what extent such activity shall be adjudged a derogation of the public right of user, are matters for legislative judgment. 4 See, in particular New York Times v Sullivan (1964) 376 US 254 and Bigelow v Virginia (1975) 421 US 809.
5 Virginia Pharmacy Board v Virginia Consumer Council (1976) 425 US 748.
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Our question is whether speech which ‗does no more than propose a commercial transaction' is so removed from ‗any exposition of ideas' and from ‗truth, science, morality, and arts in general, in its diffusion of liberal sentiments on the administration of Government, that it lacks all protection. Our answer is that it is not … 6
What is at issue is whether a State may completely suppress the dissemination of concededly truthful information about entirely lawful activity, fearful of that information's effect upon its disseminators and its recipients. Reserving other questions, we concluded that the answer to this one is in the negative. 7 Two points emerge from these statements, which still provide the basis of the US Supreme Court's case law: the first one refers to the rationale for extending the protection of the First Amendment to commercial speech (A.), while the second refers to the condition laid down by the US Supreme Court that speech benefits from constitutional protection only if it is ‗truthful' (B.). A.
The rationale for the constitutional protection of the freedom of commercial expression
To justify its decision in the Virginia State Board of Pharmacy case, the US Supreme Court first focused on the individual parties to the transaction proposed in the commercial advertisement. It ruled that the fact that the advertiser's interest in a commercial advertisement was purely economic did not disqualify him from protection under the First Amendment. 9 It also held that the protection enjoyed by advertisers seeking to disseminate prescription drug price information was also enjoyed by, and thus could be asserted by, the recipients of such information:
6 Ibid, 762.
7 Ibid, 773. 8 The activity must also be ‗lawful'.
9 Virginia Pharmacy Board v Virginia Consumer Council (1976) 425 US 748, 762.
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As to the particular consumer's interest in the free flow of commercial information, that interest may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the day's most urgent political debate.
10
The US Supreme Court then generalised the benefits of commercial free speech to society as a whole:
Even an individual advertisement, though entirely commercial, may be of general public interest … Obviously, not all commercial messages contain the same or even a very great public interest element. There are few to which such an element, however, could not be added.
Moreover, there is another consideration that suggests that no line between publicly ‗interesting' or ‗important' commercial advertising and the opposite kind could ever be drawn. Advertising, however tasteless and excessive it sometimes may seem, is nonetheless dissemination of information as to who is producing and selling what product, for what reason, and at what price. So long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise economy, the allocation of our resources in a large measure will be made through numerous private economic decisions. It is a matter of public interest that those decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and well informed. To this end, the free flow of commercial information is indispensable … It is also indispensable to the formation of intelligent opinions as to how that system ought to be regulated or altered. Therefore, even if the First Amendment were thought to be primarily an instrument to enlighten public decision-making in a democracy, we could not say that the free flow of information does not serve that goal.
11
In other words, the US Supreme Court has extended the protection of the First Amendment to free speech due to the paramount role which advertising plays in a free market economy not only for economic operators, but also (and perhaps more importantly) for consumers and society as a whole. The free dissemination of commercial information allows businesses to promote their goods and services, while offering the possibility to consumers of being informed about goods and services in question, which may in turn lead to increased competition between manufacturers and service providers. The underlying assumption is that if a product or a service is lawfully available on the market, consumers should be able to know about it so that they can decide which one to choose among competing products and services. purchase. 14 This is all the more necessary as advertising is paramount to the establishment and functioning of the EU internal market, the ‗area where the free movement of goods, services, persons and capital is ensured' 15 ; it allows commercial operators to break down barriers, thus granting more choice to consumers and ensuring that their consumption habits do not crystallise along national lines.
16
This approach fits in with the model of consumer protection promoted by EU political institutions, which relies on the explicit assumption that consumers must be informed in order to be sufficiently confident to engage in cross-border transactions and take full advantage of the opportunities a wider market offers.
17
The information paradigm promoted both in the United States and in Europe may only be effective if the information is of sufficient quality to guide consumer choices and effectively allows them to ‗protect' themselves. Consumer empowerment may therefore justify public intervention requiring the disclosure of a certain standard of information. As Blackmun J stated in the Virginia Pharmacy case, the greater objectivity and hardiness of commercial speech may make it appropriate to require that a commercial message appear in such a form, or include such additional information, warnings and disclaimers, as are necessary to prevent its being deceptive.
18
Requiring that consumers be provided with specific information about a product or a service is a regulatory technique that has enjoyed considerable popularity in the development of EU measures affecting the protection of consumers' interests. It places the onus on 14 Opinion of A-G Fennelly in Case C-380/03 Germany v Parliament and Council (Tobacco Advertising II) [2006] ECR I-11573, para 154.
consumers to decide what is good for them and their families, expecting them to take their personal circumstances into account. The approach of improving transparency by providing enough relevant information has the advantage of minimising interference with individual choices. The provision of information is therefore seen as a compromise: protection is provided as a result of the introduction of duties on traders to inform consumers of the qualities of their goods and services, while avoiding intrusive controls, such as bans on particular types of contract, which may unduly diminish consumer choice. 19 The rationale that well-informed consumers can be expected to manage their own affairs efficiently, provided that they are given the required information, has been applied to lifestyle choices. As regards food and dietary choices, for example, the assumption is that if consumers are aware of what each foodstuff contains, they should be trusted to apply their knowledge of nutrition and make appropriate choices. Rather than banning the marketing of a given foodstuff because of its high content of sugar, fat or salt, consumers are informed about this content, so that they can decide whether to buy it and integrate it into their diet. This reflects the view that in a society where individuals are autonomous and dislike limitations, they must take primary responsibility for the dietary choices they make on their own and their children's behalf. It also explains the focus which obesity prevention strategies in both the EU and the US have placed on the importance of providing information to consumers. 20 The regulation of how the information is provided and what it should contain allows public authorities to support individual purchasing decisions without interfering too much with consumers' personal freedom to buy what they want and with business operators' freedom to respond to, or even shape, consumer demand through advertising. 21 The responsibility for healthy choices is therefore shared between, on the one hand, consumers, who are expected to process the information made available to them when purchasing goods and services, and, on the other, regulatory authorities, which must ensure that enough information is made available to 19 Weatherill, above n 17, 84. consumers and that such information is neither false nor misleading. 22 As commercial information is seen as a necessary channel through which relevant information on competing goods and services reaches consumers, one could argue that disclosure obligations resting on commercial operators promote free speech in that they reinforce the underlying assumption that commercial information guides consumer choices.
23
At the EU level, a range of legislative measures has been adopted in order to ensure that consumers are provided with the information they need to make informed purchasing decisions. Commercial operators are therefore required to disclose information which they are most unlikely to disclose on a voluntary basis but which is nonetheless considered important in order to guide consumer choices. All stakeholders agree that the current framework is no longer fit for purpose: in light of growing obesity rates, consumers need to pay particular attention to the dietary choices they make and must have at their disposal the nutrition information required to do so. There are, however, strong disagreements between the food industry, on the one hand, and consumer and the condition that the information must not be false or misleading. Untruthful speech has never been protected for its own sake.
34
The notion of ‗misleading information' is difficult to define: not only does it encapsulate inaccurate statements, but it also covers statements which convey an unreliable impression, leading consumers to buy a good or a service they may not have bought had they understood the significance of the statement in question. The EU legislature has therefore put flesh on the bones of the framework legislation on unfair commercial practices 35 by adopting a range of more specific, sectoral instruments. Two examples will illustrate the difficulties involved in defining ‗misleading information'.
The use of the adjective ‗light' on cigarettes and other tobacco products may be understood as suggesting that light cigarettes are less detrimental to health than regular cigarettes. Nevertheless, a range of studies has established that this belief is misconceived. who felt anxious about their health but were too addicted to stop smoking. In a similar case, the jury awarded the survivors of a smoker $160,000 in compensatory damages and $150 million in punitive damages. An appellate court reversed the punitive damages award and remanded for a new trial on that issue, but the Oregon Supreme Court granted the plaintiffs permission for review. 38 In December 2008, the US Supreme Court rejected the attempt by Philip Morris to have all ‗light' cigarette lawsuits dismissed, on the ground that these suits
were not pre-empted by the Federal Cigarette Labelling and Advertising Act. To reduce the fragmentation of national rules, and therefore facilitate the functioning of the internal market, the EU legislature has adopted legislation prohibiting the use of adjectives such as ‗light' in the marketing of tobacco products. In particular, specifically. 42 It noted that this article had the purpose of ensuring that consumers are given objective information concerning the toxicity of tobacco products, 43 and that the EU legislature was entitled to ban the use of descriptors such as ‗light' on cigarettes in that such descriptors are liable to mislead consumers:
In the first place, they might, like the word ‗mild', for example, indicate a sensation of taste, without any connection with the product's level of noxious substances. In the second place, such terms such as ‗low-tar', ‗light', ‗ultra-light', do not, in the absence of rules governing the use of those terms, refer to specific quantitative limits. In the third place, even if the product in question is lower in tar, nicotine and carbon monoxide than other products, the fact remains that the amount of those substances actually inhaled by consumers depends on their manner of smoking and that that product may contain other harmful substances. In the fourth place, the use of descriptions which suggest that consumption of a certain tobacco product is beneficial to health, compared with other tobacco products, is liable to encourage smoking.
44
The regulation of food claims raises similar difficulties. This requires, first, that the average consumer can be expected to understand the beneficial effects as expressed in the claim and, secondly, that the amount of the product that can reasonably be expected to be consumed provides a significant quantity of the substance to which the claim relates. 50 In particular, certain claims will no longer be permitted if they rely on technical scientific terms of which consumers cannot be expected to have detailed knowledge, even though such claims are based on scientifically well-founded evidence.
51
Claims that a product is ‗90% fat free' are no longer allowed either: although perfectly correct, they are still misleading insofar as they suggest that the product in question has a low fat content, whereas 10% fat is actually fairly high. only for products containing no more than 3g of fat per 100g, or 1.5g per 100ml. In effect, to make a nutrition claim, a food business operator must comply with the requirements laid down in the Annex of the Regulation. 52 Consequently, the Food Claims Regulation has constrained the freedom of commercial operators to promote their foodstuffs in order to ensure that the information provided to consumers is of value to them and helps them make healthier choices.
The information paradigm, which emphasises the importance of consumer information for empowered consumer choices and therefore views consumer awareness as a public health tool, reflects a model of consumer protection placing the onus largely on individual consumers to ‗protect' themselves. Nevertheless, courts on both sides of the Atlantic have accepted that commercial speech may have to be limited in certain cases, even though it does not contain any misleading information.
III. Public Health Protection as a Limit on the Freedom of Commercial Operators to Promote their Goods and Services
The freedom of commercial operators to advertise their goods and services is not absolute (A.); it must be balanced against competing interests, including public health protection (B.).
A. The freedom of commercial expression is not absolute Article 10(2) of the ECHR explicitly states that the right of commercial operators to promote their goods and services may be limited:
The exercise of [the freedoms to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas], since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.
This provision makes it clear that the protection of public health constitutes an overriding requirement of public interest justifying that some limits may be set by law on the freedom of commercial operators to advertise their goods or services. Such restrictions must, however, be proportionate. If the communication is neither misleading nor related to unlawful activity, the government's power is more circumscribed. The State must assert a substantial interest to be achieved by restrictions on commercial speech. Moreover, the regulatory technique must be in proportion to that interest. The limitation on expression must be designed carefully to achieve the State's goal. Compliance with this requirement may be measured by two criteria. First, the restriction must directly advance the state interest involved; the regulation may not be sustained if it provides only ineffective or remote support for the government's purpose. marketing of certain goods (tobacco products, alcohol, medicines, unhealthy food) and services (medicinal treatments, gambling services) is a contributory factor in a range of chronic diseases.
62
The Court of Justice has stated that in order to restrict the freedom of commercial operators to promote their goods and services, the relevant public authority must establish that the restriction it is in accordance with the law, motivated by one or more of the legitimate aims under that provision and necessary in a democratic society-that is to say, justified by a pressing social need and, in particular, proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. 63 Thus, assessing the extent to which public authorities may restrict the marketing of harmful goods and services with a view to protecting public health very much rests on determining how competing interests should be balanced against each other: on the one hand, the freedom of expression of commercial operators to promote their goods and services; and, on the other hand, the interest of public authorities to restrict such promotion to limit the consumption of certain goods and services and ensure a higher level of public health. The proportionality assessment is therefore crucial in assessing the lawfulness of regulatory measures imposed by a public body with a view to restricting the promotion by commercial operators of the goods and services they have lawfully placed on the market.
B.
The key role of the principle of proportionality draft legislative acts shall take account of the need for any burden, whether financial or administrative, falling upon the Union, national governments, regional or local authorities, economic operators and citizens, to be minimized and commensurate with the objective to be achieved.
64
The means must be appropriate for attaining the objective pursued and must not go beyond what is necessary to achieve it.
65
The rest of this chapter compares the approach of the Court of Justice of the EU with the approach of the US Supreme Court to the proportionality assessment in cases where public health protection has been invoked to justify restrictions on the freedom of commercial operators to advertise their goods and services. Overall, the Court of Justice has left a broad margin of discretion to EU institutions and Member States, while the US Supreme Court has adopted a much less lenient approach to advertising restrictions. This difference is vividly illustrated by the constitutional challenges mounted against advertising restrictions imposed on tobacco products and alcoholic beverages on both sides of the Atlantic.
The failure of the Court of Justice to engage with existing evidence
The Tobacco Advertising litigation offers some useful indications as to how the Court of Justice assesses the proportionality of EU law measures, and measures relating to advertising restrictions more specifically. Germany had challenged two Directives (adopted respectively in 1998 66 and in 2003 67 ) banning tobacco advertising and sponsorship on a variety of grounds.
In the first case, the Court did not need to rule on whether the measure infringed the principle of proportionality, since it annulled the 1998 Directive in its entirety on the ground that the EU did not have the necessary powers to adopt the measure in question. 68 In the second case, however, the Court held that the EU legislature had not infringed the principle of conferral by adopting the 2003 Directive, and then moved on to assess the other arguments invoked by Germany, including whether the measure had been adopted in breach of the principle of proportionality.
69
The Court of Justice recalled its settled case law that the Union's legislature must be allowed a broad margin of discretion in areas which entail political, economic and social choices on its part, and in which it is called upon to undertake complex assessments. The legality of a measure adopted in that sphere can be affected only if the measure is manifestly inappropriate having regard to the objective which the competent institutions are seeking to pursue. 70 In its earlier ruling in the Karner case, the Court had added that it would be reluctant to intervene with the margin of discretion left to competent authorities in relation to the commercial use of freedom of expression, ‗particularly in a field as complex and fluctuating as advertising'. 71 On this basis, the Court continued:
In the present case, even assuming that the measures laid down in Articles 3 and 4 of the Directive prohibiting advertising and sponsorship have the effect of weakening freedom of expression indirectly, journalistic freedom of expression, as such, remains unimpaired and the editorial contributions of journalists are therefore not affected. It must therefore be found that the [EU] legislature did not, by adopting such measures, exceed the limits of the discretion which it is expressly accorded. It follows that those measures cannot be regarded as disproportionate.
72
In this judgment, the Court of Justice failed to perform the balancing exercise which the principle of proportionality requires. The same observation may be made for cases involving the compatibility of national measures imposing advertising restrictions with general free movement provisions. In the Gourmet case, the Court was called upon to assess whether the Swedish ban on alcohol advertising was contrary to the provisions on the free movement of goods and on the freedom to provide services. 73 It held:
The decision as to whether the prohibition on advertising at issue in the main proceedings is proportionate, and in particular as to whether the objective sought might be achieved by less extensive prohibitions or restrictions or by prohibitions or restrictions having less effect on intra-[Union] trade, calls for an analysis of the circumstances of law and of fact which characterise the situation in the Member State concerned, which the national court is in a better position than the Court of Justice to carry out.
74
As Andrea Biondi has noted, the judicial solution of dumping everything on the national court is very disappointing … The decision not to decide and leave it up to the national court is a clear indication of the unwillingness of the Court to interfere with Member States' policies in certain delicate area.
75
If it is true that the Gourmet judgment originated from a preliminary reference, where the referring court should settle the dispute between the parties, it is arguable that the Court of Justice failed in this case to provide the guidance necessary to assist the national authorities in discharging their duty to ensure that EU law is upheld. 76 Nevertheless, in the internal market, where the free movement of goods and services is ensured, the discretion of Member States to impose restrictions on commercial operators' freedom to promote their goods and services should be constrained by a more rigorous proportionality assessment, particularly when evidence exists supporting the proposed course of action rather than an alternative one. 77 The issue is admittedly more difficult when morality, rather than public health, is at stake.
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The Court's reasoning is strikingly brief in both these cases and, as such, differs markedly from the reasoning of Advocate-General Fennelly on exactly the same point in the first Tobacco Advertising case, that of Advocate-General Léger in the second Tobacco Advertising case, and that of Advocate-General Jacobs in Gourmet. Two points should be underlined. First, the structure of both the free movement provisions and Article 10 of the ECHR requires that the public authority wishing to impose advertising restrictions should bear the burden of establishing that the measure is necessary, and that no measures exist which are less restrictive of trade and of the freedom of commercial operators to promote their goods and services. Secondly, the Court of Justice must scrutinise the evidence presented to ensure that the public health argument put forward to justify advertising restrictions is convincing and does not rely on assumptions or, worse, prejudice. Very often, such evidence will exist and will allow public authorities to restrict advertising for goods or services the excessive consumption of which is harmful.
For example, the rationale for the Tobacco Advertising Directive is that consumption of tobacco products is dangerous to the health of smokers and-one could add-to people around them; that the advertising and sponsorship of tobacco products promote such consumption; and that the prohibition of those forms of expression will result in a reduction in tobacco consumption and, thus, improved public health. 78 The damage caused to health by smoking has not been disputed in the Tobacco Advertising cases, and Germany underlined its own desire to reduce consumption among its population. There has, however, been considerable debate over whether the prohibition of most forms of promotion of tobacco products can achieve a reduction in consumption of tobacco, rather than simply affecting competition between tobacco brands. It is useful at this stage to refer to the evidence gathered by the WHO, which supports comprehensive bans on tobacco advertising and all other forms of promotion:
The tobacco industry claims that its advertising and promotion efforts are not intended to expand sales or attract new users, but simply to reallocate market share among existing users. 78 Recital 3 of the Preamble to the Tobacco Advertising Directive provides that ‗the legislation of the Member
States to be approximated is intended to protect public health by regulating the promotion of tobacco, an addictive product responsible for over half a million deaths in the Community annually, thereby avoiding a situation where young people begin smoking at an early age as a result of promotion and become addicted'. This is not true. Marketing and promotion increase tobacco sales and therefore contribute towards killing more people by encouraging current smokers to smoke more and decreasing their motivation to quit. Marketing also urges potential users-and young people specifically-to try tobacco and become long-term customers. Tobacco advertising targeting youth and specific demographic subgroups is particularly effective.
Marketing creates other obstacles that blunt tobacco control efforts. Widespread tobacco advertising ‗normalises' tobacco, depicting it as being no different from any other consumer product. That makes it difficult for people to understand the hazards of tobacco use. Marketing falsely associates tobacco with desirable qualities such as youth, energy, glamour and sex appeal. It also strengthens the tobacco industry's influence over the media, as well as sporting and entertainment businesses, through billions of dollars in annual spending on advertising, promotion and sponsorship … A ban on marketing and promotion is a powerful weapon against the tobacco epidemic … To be effective, bans must be complete and apply to all marketing and promotional categories. If only television and radio advertising is blocked, the tobacco industry will move its budgets to other marketing avenues, such as newspapers, magazines, billboards or the Internet. If all traditional advertising is blocked, the industry will convert advertising expenditure to sponsorship of events popular among youth such as racing, sports, music festivals … 79 Consequently, the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, the first public health treaty ever adopted under the auspices of the WHO, calls upon its Contracting Parties 80 to recognise that a comprehensive ban on advertising, promotion and sponsorship would reduce the consumption of tobacco products, and to undertake, in accordance with their constitutions or constitutional principles, a comprehensive ban on all tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship, including a cross-border ban on advertising, promotion and sponsorship originating from their territories.
81
The Court of Justice should review existing evidence, rather than simply rule that the EU legislature or national authorities should be granted a broad margin of discretion. exempted from its duty, as the EU's constitutional court, to review the proportionality of legislative measures: the burden of proving that a public health measure is proportionate rests on legislative authorities, and the Court must ensure that they have discharged this burden.
Discretion is not to be equated with arbitrariness.
Furthermore, it is arguable that the application of a stronger standard of review by the Court of Justice will reinforce the constitutionality of advertising bans and ultimately lead to a higher level of public health protection. In light of the fact that the Court has allowed freedom of commercial expression to be restricted for public health reasons in several cases, it is tempting to suggest that these cases have heralded a clear victory for public health over commercial expression. On the other hand, the insufficient and therefore unconvincing reasoning of the Court may cut both ways. Its lack of guidance on how the proportionality of a measure should be assessed could have perverse results on the legislative process more generally, in that it does not encourage the EU legislature or national authorities to justify their choices. In other words, the excessively loose standard of review applied by the Court sends out the wrong message. A stricter standard of review would provide the necessary incentive for the EU legislature or national authorities to improve ex ante mechanisms and ensure that the legislative measures they adopt are both as protective of public health and as respectful of fundamental rights as possible. The less the legislature does consider the balance and engage in a thorough assessment of competing interests, the stronger the possibility for commercial operators to claim that their freedom of expression has been unduly restricted and that they have been unfairly stigmatised.
The debates concerning the regulation of the marketing of unhealthy food to children illustrate these points. Over the last 15 years there has been growing concern that much of the food marketed to children is high in fat, salt and sugar, and has both immediate and long-term damaging effects on their health. It conditions and habituates children to an unhealthy diet, contributes to overweight and obesity, causing elevated blood pressure, cholesterol and blood sugar levels, and leads to type 2 diabetes. Nevertheless, food operators have objected that exposing children to food advertising does not lead to obesity as such, arguing that the main problem which children encounter is their lack of physical activity. Following the industry's claim that the relationship between eating patterns and television advertising is not established, 82 research has become more focused and has attempted to prove the causal link between food advertising and children's weight. Various regulatory authorities have commissioned independent research to explore whether a correlation exists between weight gain and children's exposure to food marketing. The evidence gathered so far suggests that such a correlation does exist, and it has identified the need to restrict the promotion of unhealthy food to children. 83 Consequently, in its Global Strategy on Diet, Physical Activity and Health, the WHO identified the regulation of the marketing of food to children as an area requiring further action and initiated wide-ranging consultations with Contracting Parties, with representatives of the food and advertising industries, and with public health and consumer advocates. 84 Similarly, the European Commission specifically asked stakeholders for their views on how food advertising to children should be regulated in the consultation which led to its Obesity Prevention White Paper of May 2007.
85
The developing evidence base has led to a range of policy initiatives at different levels.
At EU level, the Audiovisual Media Services Directive provides that 82 The food industry has claimed for years that if children who watch a lot of television are getting fat, it is due to their insufficient levels of physical activity, rather than to its intensive marketing of unhealthy foods. Even if sedentary lifestyles do play a role in the increase of obesity, this explanation nonetheless appears somewhat simplistic. 85 ‗As far as advertising and marketing is concerned, it has to be ensured that consumers are not misled, and that especially the credulity and lacking media literacy of vulnerable consumers and, in particular children, are not exploited. This regards in particular advertising for foods high in fat, salt and sugars, such as energy-dense snacks and sugar-sweetened soft drinks, and the marketing of such products in schools': COM(2007) 279 final, para V.1.2.
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Member States and the Commission shall encourage media service providers to develop codes of conduct regarding inappropriate audiovisual commercial communication, accompanying or included in children's programmes, of foods and beverages containing nutrients and substances with a nutritional or physiological effect, in particular those such as fat, trans-fatty acids, salt/sodium and sugars, excessive intakes of which in the overall diet are not recommended.
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Despite its ineffectiveness, 87 this provision nonetheless recognises the need to restrict the exposure of children to unhealthy food marketing.
At the national level, following an extensive consultation process, the UK has adopted measures which go further than the minimum standard laid down at EU level by the Audiovisual Media Services Directive and which are more likely to reduce the marketing pressure on children. These measures, which came into effect on a phased basis from April 2007 to 1 January 2009, include a total ban on unhealthy food advertising in and around all children's television programming and on dedicated children's channels, as well as in youthorientated and adult programmes which attract a significantly higher than average proportion of viewers under the age of 16. 89 Available at <www.who.int/dietphysicalactivity/marketing-food-to-children/en/index.html>, accessed 12 July 2010.
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90
The fact that the marketing of unhealthy food to children has now been proven to contribute to an ‗obesogenic' environment reinforces the basis for invoking public health arguments to limit the freedom of commercial operators to promote unhealthy food to children. Nevertheless, this does not mean that public authorities will not have to exercise their discretion in deciding how far food marketing should be restricted. Several questions have not been conclusively answered by existing evidence. In particular, there seems to be no agreement concerning the age until which children need specifically to be protected from justifiable as reasonable restrictions in a free and democratic society. Under section 1, the Government was required to show that the objective of the law related to a pressing and substantial objective, and that the means chosen to achieve that objective were proportionate to the objectives pursued. This required that the measures chosen were rationally connected to the objective and minimally impaired the guaranteed right. The judgment of the majority upheld the legislation primarily on a 'manipulation' thesis. The concern addressed was ‗the protection of a group which is particularly vulnerable to the techniques of seduction and manipulation abundant in advertising', which ‗accords with a general goal of consumer protection legislation or, in other words, to protect a group that is most vulnerable to commercial manipulation'. The judgment identified several issues, that is the particular susceptibility of young children to media manipulation, their inability to differentiate between reality and fiction and to grasp the persuasive intention behind the message, and the secondary effects of exterior influences on the family and parental authority.
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In order to establish a factual basis for this concern, the Court relied on the conclusions of the US Federal Trade Commission in relation to television advertising aimed at children aged under 7 years old, issued in 1970 when a similar debate was taking place in the United
States. 96 However, as Iain Ramsay has observed, these findings did not in fact answer the question before the Court, since the US Federal Trade Commission's conclusions related to television advertising and to children aged under 7, whereas the Quebec legislation related to all forms of advertising and included children up to age 13. The Court cited no specific evidence to support these extensions. 97 As discussed above, the issue of when children are able to ‗argue against' advertising is controversial. Consequently, the majority also argued that the Court should show deference to a legislative decision in the area of balancing 97 I Ramsay, Advertising, Culture and the Law (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1996) .
competing economic and social interests where there was incomplete scientific evidence. It also noted that, since the ban could be rationalised as only partial-advertisers were still able to direct advertising to adults-the means chosen were not disproportionate to the objective to be achieved.
98
This example shows that public authorities should adduce existing evidence to justify the restrictions they have imposed on freedom of commercial expression. At the EU level, the Court of Justice should assess the evidence and decide, on its basis, whether the measure is necessary to protect children's health and not over-restrictive of the freedom of food operators to advertise their goods. It is only when the evidence is not conclusive that the Court should allow a margin of discretion to the relevant public authorities, provided that they have established that their intervention is reasonable.
The US Supreme Court's excessive reliance on the information paradigm
The US Supreme Court has proved much more willing to scrutinise legislative restrictions on advertising than the Court of Justice of the EU when public health considerations are invoked.
Its approach finds two interesting illustrations in the 44 Liquormart 99 and Lorillard 100 cases, 98 This does not address the problems associated with the exposure of children to food marketing during programmes which are not classified as children's programmes but which nonetheless are viewed by many children. This consideration is important in light of the fact that a large proportion of the time children spend watching television is outside designated children's viewing times (71% in the UK, for example, according to Ofcom's calculations).
99 44 Liquormart v Rhode Island (1996) 517 US 484. In this case, the US Supreme Court invalidated a total ban on advertisements providing information about the prices of alcoholic drinks. As part of its assessment, the Court clearly stated that advertising bans amounted to the manipulation of consumer choices by keeping them ignorant (517 US 484, 522) . This statement reinforces the position which the Court had adopted in its earlier decision in Virginia Pharmacy Board v Virginia Consumer Council (1976) commercial operator will insist only on the positive aspects of the goods or the services it offers. Advertising is one-sided, and the requirements highlighted above to disclose certain information to consumers cannot compensate for this fact. For example, claiming that certain breakfast cereals are low in fat suggests that they are healthier than they really are, as they may contain some 40 per cent of added sugars. Moreover, in many cases, the commercial operator will appeal to the feelings of consumers rather than their rational abilities to think critically: a beautiful woman enjoying a glass of wine, a sporty man driving a powerful car, happy children eating a bar of chocolate and so on. In these cases, the information value of advertising is very low indeed, even though this marketing technique may nonetheless prove very effective to induce consumption. 103 Jeffery, above n 96; Pomeranz, above n 96. 104 The Framework Convention on Tobacco Control recognises that ‗cigarettes and some other products containing tobacco are highly engineered so as to create and maintain dependence, and that many of the compounds they contain and the smoke they produce are pharmacologically active, toxic, mutagenic and carcinogenic, and that tobacco dependence is separately classified as a disorder in major international classifications of diseases' (Preamble).
education can contribute towards such change 106 ; however, information alone is unlikely to lead to change unless it can overcome counteracting psychological, behavioural, economic and environmental barriers. Achieving behaviour change is far from straightforward. Tackling obesity involves a variety of short-and longer-term goals, including what may be challenging alterations to diet, changes in how the retail sector influences shopping behaviour, increases in the amount of exercise engaged in, different choices of transport, and so on. Research shows that people and their environment interact to determine behaviour and the potential for behaviour change. There is also evidence that there are difficulties in making healthy choices in some environments more than in others. These studies illustrate the considerable psychological effort needed to combat the temptations of an unhealthy lifestyle, and how freedom of choice can sometimes, counter-intuitively, make it more difficult to resist temptation. 107 Moreover, a key feature of behaviours that promote public health is that they will deliver gains for the individual and for the population only if they are maintained in the long term. 107 Stress and habit formation also impede the ability to resist temptation. societies have to face to ensure a high level of public health protection should be acknowledged rather than sacrificed on the basis of a flawed argument resting exclusively on the information paradigm as key to liberal market economies.
The comparison of the case law of the Court of Justice of the EU with the case law of the US Supreme Court highlights the very different stances that these two constitutional courts have adopted in relation to restrictions on commercial speech imposed for public health reasons. The former is very reluctant to exercise its review powers, and has failed to require that public authorities intending to curtail the freedom of commercial operators to advertise their goods and services effectively discharge the burden of proving that their restrictive measures are necessary to protect public health and do not have any suitable, less restrictive alternatives. By contrast, the US Supreme Court has made it excessively difficult for public authorities to impose any meaningful advertising restrictions, on the ground that truthful information on which consumers are likely to rely to decide what they should buy should not be suppressed. A more balanced approach is required which combines the skill of the US Supreme Court in ensuring that public authorities discharge the burden of proving that restrictions to commercial speech are proportionate, with the caution of the Court of Justice in ensuring that it does not substitute its assessment for that of the legislature. 114 It is only then that the discourse of both public authorities and commercial operators will be accurately scrutinised, consumer choices effectively supported and public health adequately protected.
113 44 Liquormart v Rhode Island (1996) 
